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ABSTRACT
This thesis presents the findings of a study of the World
Trade Center Amsterdam. The basic premise behind the World
Trade Center concept is that the concentration of trade-
related activities and companies in one location provides
benefits to the WTC tenants and the community alike. A
secondary premise is that the developer/owner of a WTC can
capture some of the added value of those benefits through
above-market rents and fees for the services provided. The
purpose of this study is to test these assumptions.
Information for this study was gathered during extensive
personal interviews in Amsterdam with the tenants,
management, and owners of the World Trade Center. Further
information was obtained through telephone interviews.
The results of this study show that the WTC Amsterdam has
had a significant effect on its local economy. While the
impact of increased international trade is difficult to
measure, the impact of the WTC on the development of the
"High South" neighborhood is obvious. The tenants of the
WTC Amsterdam value the services and amenities of the
facility. Despite the fact that the WTC lease rates
consistently exceed the market average, there is a waiting
list of firms wanting to enter the WTC.
The real estate concept of the WTC, trade environment of
Amsterdam, and services offered as part of the WTC
designation have all contributed to the success to date of
the WTC Amsterdam.
Thesis Supervisor: Professor Lawrence Bacow
Chairman, Interdepartmental Degree
Program in Real Estate Development
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION AND ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS
Introduction
During the last fifty years dramatic changes have
occurred throughout the economies of the world. The most
significant of these changes has been the emergence, from
the fragmented and disparate regional economies that were
the norm prior to the Second World War, of a globally-linked
international economy. The concept of a World Trade Center
as a place in which the business of international trade can
be concentrated and fostered is a direct response to the
globalization of the world economic structure.
In the past, political boundaries tended to separate
economic markets. Attempting to protect domestic producers,
most nations imposed extensive tariffs, trade restrictions,
and border procedures on international commerce. Europe
provides a clear example of this. Estimates of the cost to
business of the existing border procedures between European
countries run in excess of U.S. $10 billion annually.' In
many cases, these restraints on trade made it 50% more
expensive to conduct business internationally than
domestically.2 Thus, it is not surprising that until
recently most of the movement of capital, labor, and goods
was within countries rather that between them.
That is all changing now. Technological improvements
1Decade of Change: The 1990's (television news special on "The
Monitor Channel", July 10,1992.)
2Ibid.
in the areas of transportation, telecommunications, and
electronic data transfer have combined to make it much
easier to conduct business with distant markets. The
proliferation of international trade agreements such as the
U.S./Canada Free Trade Agreement, the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the European Community and the
Latin American Free Trade Association have all served to
increase the volume of international trade.
As a result, international competition has increased,
and the prices of many goods and services are now set by
international markets, rather than by domestic conditions.
This has caused dramatic changes for some industries. The
U.S. textile and steel industries are examples of industries
that have lost much of their domestic market share to
foreign competition.
Developers and owners of real estate are also learning
that their business is not immune to the trend towards an
integrated world economy. Foreign ownership of real estate
is very common in some countries, such as Canada, and is
increasing in both the U.S. and Europe. Even when a real
estate project is domestically owned, it is now common for a
mortgage on the property to be held by a foreign lender.
International financial institutions are now theoretically
capable of providing equity and debt capital for real estate
development almost anywhere in the world. This
globalization of the capital markets means that real estate
projects in any one country must compete for scarce
financial resources with developments in other countries.
of even more significance to developers of real estate
is the fact that local markets for space are now often
influenced by the global movement of goods and services. In
areas conducive to global trade, business is thriving, which
in turn has meant that the local real estate market is
thriving. Developers and owners have recognized that it is
in their interest to promote and facilitate the growth of
the international trade industry in their region.
Around the world, businesses and governments have
realized that, to remain competitive, they must expand their
economic base into the emerging world economic market. One
common route taken by many organizations trying to expand
into the world market has been to embrace the World Trade
Center concept.
The World Trade Center Concept
The basic concept behind a World Trade Center (WTC) is
that trade opportunities can be enhanced by concentrating
companies involved in international trade and trade-related
services in one central location. Since the first WTC was
built shortly after World War Two, seventy other WTC
facilities have been completed around the world, and another
six are currently under construction. There were an
additional 124 centers in the planning stages as of January
1992.3
The burgeoning development of WTC facilities is
overseen by the organization that licences the World Trade
Center name; the World Trade Centers Association (WTCA).
Formed in 1968, the WTCA describes itself as:"An
organization that stands outside of politics, across
national boundaries, in service to those who develop and
facilitate international trade." 4 The basic objectives of
the WTCA are: to foster the expansion of world trade; to
promote international business relationships and
understanding among nations; and to foster mutual assistance
and cooperation among members of the WTCA.5
In the 28 years since the WTCA was founded, it has
expanded its mission to not only provide its membership with
a wide range of services, programs, and assistance designed
to foster international business, but also to promote the
creation of facilities that meet the criteria for
designation as a World Trade Center.
As defined by the WTCA, a World Trade Center is
comprised of two components: (1) the building and its
tenants, and (2) the trade services provided by the WTC
management. Both components must meet WTCA standards to
3World Trade Centers Association Membership Directory, pp. 18-
19.
4Ibid., p. 1.
5Constitution and Bylaws, (World Trade Centers Association, as
amended October, 1990), p. 5.
allow a WTC designation to be granted and maintained.
Therefore, a WTC must be more than just a complex of
exhibition halls, trade marts, conference centers, hotels,
and other facilities. It must also offer services and
activities devoted to international commerce. These
services typically include trade information, educational
seminars, a WTC club, meeting facilities, trade missions,
translation services and temporary secretarial services.
The mix of physical facilities and services offered must be
designed to meet the primary goal of any WTC: the promotion,
furtherance, and protection of international trade and
commerce.
In order to be able to use the "World Trade Center"
name, a facility must become a member of the WTCA. To be
granted membership in the WTCA, the facility must meet the
Association's above-described definition of a WTC.
Therefore, through the control of standards for the use of
the WTC designation, the WTCA is able to ensure that the
original goals of the World Trade Center concept continue to
be achieved.
Thesis Intent
This thesis presents the findings of a study of the
World Trade Center Amsterdam. This study was done
concurrently with four similar studies of WTC facilities in
New York City, Taipei, Portland (Oregon), and on the island
of Curacao (The Netherland Antilles). These sites were
selected by the sponsor of this study, the World Trade
Centers Association, as being representative of the seventy-
one operating World Trade Centers.
The basic premise behind the World Trade Center concept
is that the concentration of trade-related activities and
companies in one location provides benefits to the WTC
tenants and the community alike. A secondary premise is
that the developer/owner of a WTC can capture some of the
added value of those benefits through above-market rents and
fees for the services provided. The purpose of this study
is to test these assumptions. More specifically, this
thesis tries to answer three groups of questions:
A) * Does the WTC Amsterdam provide a sufficient
return to the owners to compensate them for the
additional costs incurred in gaining and
maintaining the WTC designation?
* How has the WTC Amsterdam performed financially
relative to the rest of the Amsterdam market?
* Do tenants value the services offered by the WTC
Amsterdam enough to be willing to enter into
leases on terms more favorable to the landlord
than is typical at competitive buildings? (i.e.
rent premiums, credit assurances, longer lease
terms, etc.)
B) * How successful has the WTC Amsterdam been in
stimulating the regional economy of Amsterdam?
* How successful has the facility been at
increasing the volume of international trade done
in the Amsterdam region?
* Are local officials concerned with regional
economic development satisfied with the
performance of the WTC Amsterdam to date?
C) * What value do tenants place on the affiliation
of their business with the WTC Amsterdam?
* What value do tenants place on the co-location
of trade-related businesses and services in the
WTC?
10
Information Sources
The development of a successful WTC typically involves
four separate parties: the owner/developer of the facility,
the tenants in the WTC, local public and private sector
officials responsible for regional economic development, and
the World Trade Centers Association. Each party has
different criteria for measuring the success of a WTC.
While the WTCA's criteria for success of a WTC facility was
outlined earlier, the criteria of the other parties deserve
to be discussed.
The developer/owner may measure success in specific
economic terms such as return on investment. More
specifically, the owner is concerned with the WTC's ability
to provide a sufficient return to compensate for the
additional costs associated with WTC designation. To be
considered a success from the owner's perspective, a WTC
must be able to attract tenants on terms that are more
favorable to the landlord than a competing building that
lacks WTC related services. For example, prospective
tenants must be willing to pay rental premiums, provide
credit guarantees, or sign longer-term leases.
Tenants, on the other hand, are more likely to judge
the success of a WTC by the benefits it offers them. Issues
such as the types of services provided by the WTC or how
much their business may be enhanced by proximity to other
trade-related businesses are of primary concern to tenants.
11
Officials concerned with regional economic development
will measure the success of a WTC on the basis of how that
facility has stimulated trade and other economic development
or tax revenues in its area.
At the core of this analysis is information provided,
through interviews, directly from these primary parties.
Extensive interviews were conducted in Amsterdam and by
telephone with World Trade Center managers, owners and
tenants. Other parties knowledgeable about the Amsterdam
region, though not directly involved with the development of
the WTC facility, also were a source of information. For
example, the Amsterdam Ports Association, the Netherlands
Board of Tourism, and the Chamber of Commerce and Industry
for Amsterdam all proved to be useful secondary sources of
information for this study.
Central to this study is the performance of the WTC
Amsterdam with respect to its market as a whole. Data
sources for performance issues included interviews with
local real estate brokers, private market study data, and
historical market rent-trend data. The bulk of the market
research data was provided by Jones Lang Wootton's research
department and R.B.O.G., an established Amsterdam-based real
estate consulting and investment advisory firm.
Organization of the Thesis
This study is organized into four chapters. Chapter
Two provides a history of the Amsterdam trade environment
and a physical description of the WTC facility. Pertinent
information regarding the WTC's tenant roster, amenities,
and services are discussed. Chapter Two also includes a
history of the facility; when it was built, who initiated
and sponsored it, and how it was financed.
Chapter Three is concerned with the performance of the
WTC Amsterdam from the perspectives of the primary parties
involved in the development and use of the facility. This
chapter encompasses most of the data collected from the
field interviews and site visit, and addresses the three
fundamental questions outlined earlier. Chapter Three also
provides an overview of the WTC Amsterdam's position within
its market.
Chapter Four provides a comparative analysis of the
World Trade Center Amsterdam relative to the four other WTC
facilities that were studied. Location-related concerns
such as the host country's trade environment, cultural
preferences, and economic strength are discussed relative to
how they determine the strategies and roles required of a
successful WTC. Each of the five facilities studied has had
to respond differently to the requirements of its market.
Comparisons and contrasts among these sites are used to
arrive at a series of conclusions for this study, including
whether there are common characteristics of successful WTC
developments.
CHAPTER TWO
HISTORY AND DESCRIPTION
OF THE WTC AMSTERDAM
Introduction
"Why Amsterdam?" is the on-going promotional theme of
the Chamber of Commerce and Industry for Amsterdam. While
the Chamber uses that question to promote all business
activity in the Amsterdam area, it is especially relevant
for this analysis of the World Trade Center Amsterdam.
This chapter gives an overview of the history of both the
Amsterdam market and the WTC Amsterdam facility itself.
History
For more than seven hundred years, Amsterdam has been a
trade-dependent city. From its origins in the twelfth
century as a trading center for fish, beer, timber, and
wool, Amsterdam has continually increased its influence as
one of Europe's leading commercial centers.6
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, in
what is known as the "Golden Age" of the city, Amsterdam
became the staple market of the Western world. It also
became one of the largest cities in Europe, surpassed only
by London, Paris, Naples, and Vienna.7
At the height of its power, following an influx of
French and Italian merchants and the formation of the
Effectenbeurs (Dutch Stock Exchange), Amsterdam became the
Western world's most important financial center. Throughout
6Robin Pascoe, "Dutch Courage," Voyager, June 1992, p. 12.
7F.M. Dieleman and S. Musterd, eds., The Randstad: A Research
and Policy Laboratory (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 1992), p. 1.
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most of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Amsterdam
prospered as the primary source for international lending in
Europe; the formation of the Dutch East India Company, the
Dutch Stock Exchange, and the first exchange banks all
contributed to the growth and increasing international
influence of the city.
Amsterdam's position as a major trading center was
dependent on the continuation of international free trade.
As trade restrictions were imposed during the nineteenth
century and other centers such as London expanded rapidly,
the city's prosperity and influence waned.
Other cities in the area of the western Netherlands,
now known as the Randstad, began to increase their influence
and compete with Amsterdam for international business.
Rotterdam in particular eclipsed Amsterdam in the shipping
and port facilities industries, while The Hague became the
center of the government.8
As a result of these changes, combined with the turmoil
created by the two world wars, the first half of the
twentieth century saw Amsterdam remain an influential
financial and trade-related city internationally, but not
grow as rapidly or dramatically as some other European
centers.
Origination of the World Trade Center Amsterdam Concept
By the 1960's, Amsterdam had become a city of
16
8Ibid., p. 3.
approximately 700,000 people. It was still a major
financial center, seaport, and tourist destination, and its
airport had become one of the busiest in Europe for both
passengers and freight. The explosive post-war growth of
other European centers had not been as dramatic in Amsterdam
however; the City of Amsterdam and the Chamber of Commerce
and Industry for Amsterdam were both actively searching for
ways to maintain or improve Amsterdam's self-declared
position as the "Gateway to Europe."
In 1968, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry for
Amsterdam became one of the founding members of the
fledgling "World Trade Center Association", and began to
actively promote the idea of a World Trade Center for
Amsterdam. 9 The intent of this group was to support the
creation, in Amsterdam, of a facility that would attract
international firms interested in expanding their business
into the European market.
For most of the following decade the Chamber of
Commerce and Industry for Amsterdam tried unsuccessfully to
put a suitable site and interested developer together to
create the desired facility. Several successive sites,
notably one on the city's harbour, were proposed, promoted,
and ultimately discarded for political or economic reasons.
Then, in the late 1970's, the correct opportunity
91nterview with H.J.M. Woerdman, Chamber of Commerce and
Industry for Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 24 June 1992.
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finally presented itself.
The City of Amsterdam, which owns all of the land in
Amsterdam and tightly controls the supply of land for new
development, made a large piece of land in the prestigious
South Amsterdam neighborhood available for development.
This parcel of land was very well situated relative to
transportation routes into and around the city. (see
exhibit 3). The very busy circumferential freeway, the A10,
was immediately to the south of the site, and a freeway
access ramp was planned to serve the site. 10 The east end
of the site was bounded by a major radial route into
Amsterdam, the Beethovenstraat, and the north side of the
site was accessible using a six lane divided cross-street,
the Strawinskylaan. The most significant transportation
amenity of the site, however, was immediately adjacent to
its western boundary: the South Amsterdam station of the
railway line to Schiphol airport. Trains left from that
station every fifteen minutes, and arrived at the airport
only twelve minutes later.
Schiphol airport had expanded rapidly as both a
passenger and freight airport serving the entire European
market since the end of the Second World War. By the late
1970's, after successive expansions of the airport
"Interview with B.G.J. van de Rhoer, World Trade Center
Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 25 June 1992. (Note: The
proposed freeway ramp was never built; cars must exit the A10 a few
hundred yards west of the WTC site and circle back.)
18
facilities, the number of passengers passing through
Schiphol each year had exceeded twelve million, and was
still increasing." The emergence of Amsterdam's airport
as one of Europe's busiest had created a great deal of
demand for office space close to that facility.
There was considerable interest in the site from
development companies wishing to provide office space to the
business community. There was one hitch, however; the City
of Amsterdam had zoned the site for medium-density
residential use only, and was notorious for denying rezoning
applications.
For a while it appeared that the site would remain
undeveloped until the Blauwhoed Development Company came up
with a new idea. 12 Blauwhoed, a large and well-established
Dutch development company, was aware of the interest of both
the City and the Chamber of Commerce in creating a World
Trade Center for Amsterdam; they proposed just that for the
South Amsterdam site.
The Chamber of Commerce had by this time, in the words
of one of its senior officials, "almost given up hope" that
Amsterdam would ever get a World Trade Center. 13 They were
1 The Development of Schiphol (Schiphol: Amsterdam Airport
Schiphol Public Relations Department, 1990), p. 7.
12 Telephone interview with Rolf Draak, World Trade Center
Amsterdam, 6 July 1992.
13 Interview with W. de Wit, Chamber of Commerce and Industry
for Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 26 June 1992.
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ecstatic about the Blauwhoed proposal, and gave it their
full support. It is widely believed in Amsterdam that the
support of the very influential Chamber of Commerce was the
deciding factor in the City Council's approval of the
rezoning of the site.
The strong interest of both the City Council and the
Chamber of Commerce in seeing the WTC built was further
evidenced by their subsequent resistance to pressure from
citizen's groups to deny the rezoning application. The
opposition groups to the WTC development were made up
primarily of residents of the prestigious residential
neighborhoods that exist to the north of the WTC site.14
A major condition of the rezoning approval was that the
development would not be allowed to become just another
office facility; the lease agreement between the City of
Amsterdam and the developer specifically stipulated that the
facility must obtain official designation as a World Trade
Center from the World Trade Center Association.15
Thus, even though there was no direct governmental
subsidy or financial support for the Amsterdam WTC, without
the non-financial support provided by the Chamber of
Commerce and the City of Amsterdam it is unlikely that the
WTC would have been built.
Once the re-zoning of the site had been ensured, the
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
Blauwhoed Development Company was able to generate interest
from institutional investors in providing financing for the
project. Two large Dutch institutions, the Algemeen
Burgerlijk Pensioenfonds N.V. (ABP) and the Friesch-
Groningsche Hypotheekbank N.V. (FGH) initially each
purchased one-third ownership of the project.16
With financing in place, the developer lost no time in
starting the design and programming of the WTC. The
architectural firms of Architektenbureau G. de Klerk B.V.
and Le Grand & Selle Arshitektenassociatie, both of
Amsterdam, combined forces to create the new firm
Architektenmaatschap WTC. This new firm was solely
concerned with the design, programming, and construction
coordination of the proposed World Trade Center facility.
During 1980 and 1981, the architects and engineers
worked to design a facility that was "in line with the aims
and specifications of the World Trade Centers Association,"
as was required by the lease with the City, and had the
ability to satisfy the return-on-investment requirements of
the owners.
In 1982, after the final WTC design had been reviewed
and the necessary development approvals had been obtained
from the City of Amsterdam, the two institutional investors
bought the developer out of the project and each took a 50%
16 Draak, 6 July 1992.
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position in the ownership of the facility.17
Finally, after almost fifteen years of promotion,
discussion, and waiting, construction was about to start on
Amsterdam's World Trade Center.
Attributes of the World Trade Center Amsterdam
Architectural Image
From the exterior, the WTC Amsterdam is a very slick,
modernist series of structures finished in reflective blue
curtain-wall glazing and white steel panels. The 75,000
square meter (807,000 square foot) complex is comprised of
four office towers and a low-rise building connecting the
towers. Hidden from view beneath the buildings there is a
two-level, 35,000 square meter (377,000 s.f.) underground
parking garage with a capacity of 1200 cars.
The two central office towers are seventeen stories
tall while the towers at either end of the site are each
twelve stories tall.
In all, the impact of the WTC when viewed from any of
the adjacent roads or neighborhoods is very striking,
especially when considered in the predominantly low-rise
surroundings of Amsterdam. (see exhibit 4).
Special Facilities
The "total concept" approach taken by the designers of
the WTC was a first for the Amsterdam market. The provision
of a retail shopping arcade, banking services, a post
22
17 Ibid.
office, copying services, dental offices, and restaurants
all within the same complex as the office towers had not
been seen before by tenants in Amsterdam. To this day, the
majority of office space available in the city is in single-
use office buildings.18 In the older sections of the city
the office workers leave their buildings and go along the
street for their lunch or service needs, while in the
suburbs they often have to get in their cars and drive to a
retail area.
Amsterdam has a problem currently with both a lack of
space for parking and a high rate of automobile break-ins.
These factors combine to create a strong demand for on-site,
secure parking facilities. Thus, the availability of
underground parking at the WTC has also proven to be a major
factor in the success of the project. In interviews,
tenants repeatedly emphasized the high value they place on
having access to the World Trade Center's underground
garages. One tenant particularly valued being able to leave
his car in the WTC garage while he travelled from Schiphol
airport on business.19
Additional facilities provided by the WTC Amsterdam
include a 525 square meter (5,650 s.f.) open exhibition
area, a video-conferencing studio, a press center that is
18 Interview with H.A.F. Hagemeijer, Zadelhoff Makelaars (Real
estate brokers), Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 24 June 1992.
19 Interview with Ph. J.D. Molhuysen, English & American Group
Plc, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 23 June 1992.
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able to accommodate up to eighty people at a time, short-
term executive offices, and a variety of conference rooms.
Conference Facilities
The largest of the conference rooms is the "Amsterdam
Room", with a capacity of up to 250 people. This room is a
multi-purpose auditorium that was designed by acoustical
engineers to create a state-of-the-art lecture and
presentation environment. The Amsterdam Room is also
equipped with a full range of audiovisual equipment,
including large-screen video projection.
Separate from the Amsterdam Room, there are seven
smaller conference rooms clustered around a central meeting
space. These rooms, located at the second floor level of
the low-rise building, make up the WTC Conference Center and
are designed to each accommodate meetings of up to fourteen
people. The Conference Center rooms are equipped with
electrically operated blinds, conference tables and seating,
projection screens, telephone and telex connections, and
remote-controlled lighting.
A third group of conference/classroom spaces
encompasses the entire fourth floor of one of the office
towers. This area is known as the WTC Business Training and
Education Center, and is used for courses, meetings, or
seminars for groups of four to forty people. There are a
total of fourteen meeting rooms in this area that are
available for rent on a short-term basis. A consistent
evening-hours user of this space is a local company that
provides educational programs for executives.20
In any of the WTC conference facilities a meeting can
be fully catered. The independent catering company that
services the WTC Club restaurant and cafeteria also serves
the needs of the conference facilities.
The use of the special facilities provided by the WTC
is considerable; over 2500 meetings each year are held in
the World Trade Center.21 Approximately 65% of those
meetings are organized by non-tenants of the facility. The
consistent use of the WTC conference facilities by non-
tenant parties means that those facilities provide the WTC
with not only revenue, but also an effective marketing
opportunity. Each new conference demonstrates the WTC
facility to a new group, and therefore potentially increases
the number of tenants interested in locating at the WTC.
The current relaxed attitude of the WTC management about
directly advertising the WTC can at least partly be
attributed to the on-going advertising that the conference
facilities provide. Therefore, the promotional budget for
the WTC conference facilities serves a dual purpose.
Office Space
Away from the low-rise facilities of the WTC, the
20 van de Rhoer, 22 June 1992.
21 Ibid.
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interior space on any of the office levels is fairly
standard, modern office space. Each entire floor is
organized on a rectangular, standardized grid so that
demising walls can be configured rationally. The HVAC,
electrical services, telephone, and lighting systems are all
located in the plenum above the suspended ceiling to
facilitate tenant improvement changes. Washroom facilities
for each floor are located at the central core; tenants are
unable to get water service to their individual suites.
The "footprint" of each of the four towers is quite
long and narrow relative to a typical North American
speculative office building. One reason for this is the
Dutch building codes that require relatively high levels of
natural light at all office work areas. 22 The more
important reason for the shape of the WTC towers is that
their narrow configuration was well suited to the specific
leasing strategy of the developer. The narrow towers allow
each floor to be subdivided into small office areas
efficiently. That is, the high perimeter to floor area
ratio of the rectangular plan meant that many small offices
could be located on each floor without leaving large
interior floor areas unusable.
The WTC towers are not designed to accommodate large
floor-plate, "back-office" users because that is not who the
developer wanted to attract to the facility. Historically,
22 Ibid.
new small first-class office space has been very difficult
to find in Amsterdam; all of the new office buildings were
designed to lease large blocks, or entire floors, to single
tenants. As a result, Blauwhoed and the other investors
perceived a strong demand for small office space in the
market. The intent of the WTC development from the
beginning was to capture some of that demand by providing
space that small office users would want.23
Special Services
The final attribute that the WTC has over its
competition is the range of special services that it offers
to its tenants. These services include extensive security
systems, 24-hour accessibility to the building, and the
availability of in-house catering for any office function.
Probably the most important service, at least to the
smaller tenants, that is available is the in-house Business
Services Department. This department is able to provide, on
a pay-for-use basis, a full range of secretarial,
translation, business office, and telephone answering
services to firms that require them.
Companies who choose to locate in the WTC also have the
option to join the local association of WTC tenants and
therefore not only be able to use of the WTC club and
restaurant, but also attend regular trade-related seminars
and lectures organized by that association.
23 Draak, 6 July 1992.
Conclusions
The WTC Amsterdam is unique not so much because it is
the only WTC facility in Amsterdam, but because it is a
particularly well conceived, well executed, and unique real
estate project. The Blauwhoed Development Company
understood the Amsterdam office market and identified a
market niche, the small tenant submarket, that was not being
well served. In addition to providing small office space,
the developer identified and provided several amenities that
were valued by the market. The most valued of these
amenities is the secure underground parking garage. Fully
72% of the tenants interviewed claimed that the parking
facilities were "very important" in their decision to locate
in the WTC. (see exhibit 2). The on-site retail facilities
and other consumer services have also proven to be highly
valued by tenants, and have therefore served to further
differentiate the WTC from the competition. The location of
the WTC has also proven to be first rate. It is near the
airport and well served by both public transportation and
the Amsterdam highway network. The practical benefits of
the WTC location are further enhanced by the prestige
associated with its neighborhood. For years a very
exclusive residential neighborhood, High South Amsterdam has
been transformed by the development of the area around the
WTC into one of the most prestigious business districts in
the city. One tenant even stated that prestige was 90% of
the reason behind his organization's decision to re-locate
their offices from downtown Amsterdam to the World Trade
Center. 24
In addition to the above real estate attributes, the
developer has even further differentiated this project by
both providing a range of WTC services and focusing leasing
efforts on trade-related businesses.
The next chapter evaluates how well this combination, a
well conceived real estate project coupled with the WTC
designation and services, has performed relative to the
Amsterdam market. The evaluation is done from the
viewpoints of the four parties involved in the WTC. Thus,
the WTC's success at stimulating trade, providing regional
economic development, creating benefits for its tenants, and
generating above market returns to its owners are all
examined.
24 Interview with J. van de Plassche, Swissair, Amsterdam, The
Netherlands, 23 June 1992.
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CHAPTER THREE
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF THE WTC
RELATIVE TO THE AMSTERDAM MARKET
30
Introduction
The information for this chapter was collected
primarily from interviews conducted on site in Amsterdam.
Some additional information was obtained through telephone
interviews from Cambridge, Massachusetts.
This chapter analyzes the performance of the WTC to
date from the perspectives of four interested parties: the
WTC tenants, officials responsible for regional economic
development, the management company/owners, and the WTCA.
The three major questions posed by this study, which were
outlined in Chapter One, are discussed from the viewpoints
of these four parties.
A. Investment Performance of WTC Amsterdam
For obvious reasons, the owners and managers of the WTC
Amsterdam are the group most interested in how well the
facility performs financially. The primary objective of
this group is to ensure that the WTC development provides a
financial return sufficient to compensate them for their
investment. That investment included not only the costs
incurred through the development of the facility, but also
the costs associated with obtaining and maintaining the WTC
designation.
The company that manages the WTC is headed by Mr. Rolf
Draak, who has been involved with the WTC Amsterdam since
its inception. As a project manager for the Blauwhoed
Development Company in the 1980's, Mr. Draak was directly
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responsible for the development coordination of the WTC
facility.
Mr. Draak's current firm, appropriately named the World
Trade Center Management Company, is employed by the owners
of the WTC on a management contract basis. For a percentage
fee based on the rental income of the facility, the WTC
Management Company provides all of the standard maintenance,
repair, and tenant contact services necessary for the
facility. In addition, the WTC Management Company is
responsible for providing not only the special services
offered as part of the WTC concept, but also all leasing
services required by the facility.25
In order to best provide this variety of services, the
company is organized into four departments. These
departments, which are run on an individual cost-center
basis, are the Finance Department, the Business Services
Department, the Meeting and Restaurant Facilities
Department, and the Commercial Department.
As was stated in Chapter Two, ownership of the WTC
Amsterdam is divided equally between two large Dutch
institutional investors. One owner is the Dutch government
pension fund, ABP, and the other is the private mortgage
bank, FGH.
There is no mortgage held on the facility; the two
investors have bought it outright and are therefore
25 Draak, 6 July 1992.
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primarily concerned with the return-on-investment that the
WTC can provide. Since ABP is a tax-exempt entity, while
FGH pays taxes, each owner has different requirements of the
investment that they have made in the WTC. For reasons of
confidentiality and competitiveness, neither of the owners
has been willing to provide their original investment
requirements, or actual investment yields, for this
study.26
It appears that the investors are satisfied with the
performance of the project to date; both ABP and FGH have
tried to buy each other out of the deal in the past few
years. This enthusiasm for ownership of the project
suggests that the investment yields provided by the WTC over
the last few years have at least matched the approximately
6.25% annual gross investment yields provided by other
"class A" office properties in the Amsterdam area. (see
figure 1).
When the Amsterdam WTC facility was opened in 1985, it
had an immediate impact on the city's real estate market.
At 75,000 square meters, it represented fully 25% of the
entire new supply of office space built in Amsterdam that
year. (see figure 2). As noted earlier, the WTC was the
first of several large office projects developed in the
"High South" neighborhood of the city; it has been a
significant factor in the subsequent growth of that area.
26 Ibid.
Figure 1
The timing of the WTC development was very fortunate. In
1983 the take-up rate for Amsterdam was 65,000 square meters
(700,000 s.f.) of office space. By 1985, that rate had
exploded to 120,000 square meters (1.3 million s.f.), and
increased rapidly to a peak of 385,000 square meters (4.1
million s.f.) in 1989. (see figure 2).
This surging demand for office space has meant that
lease rates in the prime office areas of the city have
consistently risen since 1984. At the time of the WTC
opening, lease rates for "A" quality office space in
Amsterdam were averaging 295 guilders/square meter/year.
Gross Investment Yields
"Class A" Amsterdam OffTce Space
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Figure 2
The initial rents in the WTC were 325 guilders/square
meter/year, or 10.2% higher than the market.
Comparing the WTC's lease rates to the market average
charged by other prime office space in Amsterdam, for the
period from 1985 through 1991, reveals that the WTC
consistently out-performed the market. Between 1985 and
1991 the lease rates in the WTC increased from 325
Dfl/sq.m./yr to 480 Dfl./sq.m./yr. 27 During the same seven
year period, the average lease rates for first rate office
27 Gijsberts, 26 June 1992. Given the current exchange rate
of 1.7 Dfl/U.S.$, these lease rates increased from $18/s.f. to
$26.50/s.f. approximately.
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space in Amsterdam increased from 295 Dfl/sq.m./yr to
450 Dfl/sq.m./yr. (see figure 3). While the WTC rates
increased at a slightly slower rate than the rest of the
market, approximately 48% versus 53% over seven years, they
remained consistently ahead of the market.
At first inspection, a roughly 10% differential in
lease rates over the market does not appear to be enough to
cover the costs of the additional services provided by the
World Trade Center. That is because it is not intended to
do so. Mr. Rolf Draak of the WTC Management Company, who
oversees the provision of the special services, is very
aware of the added management costs that those services
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incur for a project. Therefore, in order to cover the costs
of the special services, every tenant in the WTC must pay an
annual service charge of 95 Dfl/sq.m./year, over and above
the 10% lease-rate differential.
If the annual charge for the special services is
included in the annual rent for WTC space, then that rent
effectively exceeded the market rate by 28% in 1991.
When these significant premiums in rates are taken into
consideration, the success of the WTC Amsterdam from a
leasing standpoint is phenomenal. The facility is currently
98% leased, and there is a waiting list of tenants who want
to be in the building.28 The management company's in-house
leasing broker, Mr. A.W.J. Gijsberts, does no advertising of
the building other than that which occurs automatically
through the activities of the conference center. Despite
this, he is able to be "very selective" about who he
encourages to enter the facility.
The excess demand for space at the WTC has allowed the
management company to require credit references and a bank
guarantee of one year's rent from any incoming tenant.29
All of this in a commercial real estate market that,
while not as bad as New England's, has slowed down
considerably from its peak in the late 1980's. The most
28 Interview with A.W.J. Gijsberts, World Trade Center
Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 26 June 1992.
29 Ibid.
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Figure 4
recent market study, conducted by the Amsterdam office of
Jones Lang Wootton's research department, shows the office
vacancy rate to be 6.4% currently. (see figure 4). While
this rate is not excessive, and is actually a reduction from
the levels of 1991, local real estate brokers caution that
the imminent completion of several suburban office projects
could drive the vacancy rate as high as 15% later this
year. 30 Exacerbating the vacancy problem caused by the new
construction is the dramatic drop in the office space
absorption rate during the last three years. In 1989, new
30 Hagemeijer, 24 June 1992.
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leases were signed on 385,000 square meters(4.1 million
s.f.) of office space. By 1991, that figure had dropped by
45% to 211,000 square meters(2.3 million s.f.), and is
projected to continue to fall in 1992.31 (see figure 2).
At this time, it is not at all uncommon when driving around
the commercial districts of the city to see large, faded
banners offering office space for lease.
The WTC Amsterdam has avoided a vacancy problem thus
far by capturing one small, but expanding, segment of the
Amsterdam office market. In the words of one established
local real estate broker: "The World Trade Center has
effectively created its own market. The tenants that I send
(to the WTC) are small start-ups or branch offices of
international firms. The WTC is where they belong."32
This identity as the location in which small
international firms "belong" has been actively fostered by
the management of the WTC. For the last few years the WTC
Management Company has been concentrating on trying to
create space in the WTC for foreign-based companies who wish
to open a small satellite office in Europe while they "test
the waters." This strategy is intended to boost the
percentage of WTC tenants that are directly involved in
international trade. In the opinion of Mr. Gijsberts, the
31 Telephone interview with T.S. Offringa, Jones Lang Wootton
Research Department, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 14 July 1992.
32 Telephone interview with Mr. Cramer, Van Gool en Partners
(real estate brokers), Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 23 June 1992.
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World Trade Center name was a significant help to his
leasing efforts, particularly with the foreign-based firms.
He said that the American and Japanese firms in particular
were familiar with the reputation of the WTC designation,
and attached value to it.33
The best estimates that Mr. Gisjberts is able to make
about the current tenant mix are that approximately 50% of
the tenants currently conduct "most or all" of their
business internationally, while 65% conduct "some" of their
business internationally. A large portion of the remaining
tenants are subsidiaries of foreign firms who are doing
business in the Netherlands. The balance of the total
tenant roster are Dutch firms doing business in The
Netherlands primarily.
The current prosperous and enviable position that the
WTC is in has not always been the case. During 1985 and 1986
leasing proceeded slowly and there was some unwanted tenant
turnover.
While the higher than market lease rates were a
contributing factor, Rolf Draak and his managers attribute
the slow initial lease-up of the center primarily to two
other factors: the unfamiliarity of Dutch companies with the
WTC concept, and the long lead-time required to establish a
reputation for the facility with foreign-based firms. The
WTC in-house leasing broker, Mr. A.W.J. Gijsberts, also
33 Gijsberts, 26 June 1992.
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noted that the slow initial lease-up was at least partially
due to the fact that it simply takes longer to fill a
building with small tenants.
The initial slow lease-up period has been overcome
though, and the small-office concept has proven itself to be
successful. So successful, in fact, that the Owners have
plans to expand the facility with another tower. This new
building would provide more office space and would also
house a 600 room first-class business hotel. The
expectations are that the hotel could be 35% booked solely
through demand of visitors to the World Trade Center. 34
The WTC Management Company projects that the rest of the
rooms would be filled by business travellers who want to be
within easy range of the airport, but not so close that they
are under the flight paths.
While agreeing that the additional office space
provided by the proposed expansion could be filled, local
Brokers caution that expectations of further lease rate
increases for the WTC should be reduced. 35 With the
looming possibility that the commercial vacancy rate in the
suburbs could reach 10% to 15%, lease rates are flat and
tenants are being offered significant incentives to enter
into leases.
The WTC tenants interviewed stated that, while the
34 van de Rhoer, 22 June 1992.
35 Eweg, 24 June 1992.
buildings that are offering incentives are not typically as
well suited to small tenants as the WTC, a further increase
in the disparity between WTC rates and the rest of the
market could lead to tenants leaving the WTC.
Fortunately for the Owners, even if the rates at the
World Trade Center Amsterdam were to remain flat for some
time, the success of the facility, from an investment
standpoint, appears to be secure.
B. WTC Contribution to Local Economy
The second objective of this study was to determine the
benefit provided to the regional economy by the development
of the WTC Amsterdam. The group that is most concerned
with, and most likely to monitor, the impact of the WTC on
the economy of the Amsterdam region are the public and
private sector officials concerned with the economic
development of the Amsterdam region.
At the beginning of this study I had expected it to be
difficult to accurately determine the opinion of this group
about the success of the WTC Amsterdam. Fortunately, in
Amsterdam there is one institution that effectively
represents this group: the Amsterdam Chamber of Commerce.
Officially known as "The Chamber of Commerce and
Industry for Amsterdam," this organization is significantly
different from a typical North American chamber of commerce.
The most significant difference is that in The
Netherlands membership in the Chamber of Commerce is
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mandatory for all companies who wish to do business within
the jurisdiction of that Chamber. A second distinct
characteristic of a Dutch Chamber of Commerce is that it is
a quasi-governmental organization; while its annual
operating budget is derived from fees charged to its
members, that budget is audited each year by the accounting
ministry of the government of The Netherlands.6
A Dutch Chamber of Commerce has two primary roles. The
first is to keep detailed records about every company doing
business within its jurisdiction, and the second is to work
to enhance the business environment of its members. Within
its role as record-keeper, the Amsterdam Chamber of Commerce
acts as an information source for anyone trying to find out
about a firm doing business in the Amsterdam area. Simply
by going to the Chamber's main reference library, one can
find out about the location, history, and ownership
structure of any firm working in Amsterdam.
The Chamber of Commerce and Industry for Amsterdam was
an influential supporter of the WTC Amsterdam in its bid to
get the South Amsterdam site re-zoned. The Chamber has
retained close ties with the WTC and currently has a Trade
Information Center office and display area in the main hall
of the WTC facility.
The Director of Trade Promotion for the Chamber, Mr.
H.J.M. Woerdman, is relatively satisfied with the benefits
36 de Wit, 26 June 1992.
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that the WTC has provided to the regional economy. He feels
that the WTC has fostered significant economic growth for
Amsterdam. This growth has occurred not only in the area of
international trade, but also through emergence of the "High
South" area as the premier office location in the city.37
The construction boom in the "High South" neighborhood
since 1983 has created hundreds of construction jobs and
significantly added to the tax base of the City of
Amsterdam.
The only thing that Mr. Woerdman feels that the World
Trade Center Amsterdam could do to improve its contribution
to the regional economy even further is to increase the
amount of WTC exhibition space available for use by foreign
trade missions.
The third objective of this study was to try to
determine the benefits that the WTC Amsterdam provides to
its tenants. The following section reflects the opinions of
the WTC tenants interviewed about the benefits that they
have received from association with the WTC.
C. WTC Benefits to Tenants
During the interview process, it became apparent that
the benefits provided to the tenants by the WTC fall into
two categories. The first category of benefits are those
that are a result of the physical amenities provided by the
37 Interview with H.J.M. Woerdman, Chamber of Commerce and
Industry for Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 24 June 1992.
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WTC complex, and are thus due to the design of the facility.
The second category of benefits result from the special
services provided by the WTC.
It also became apparent that the amount of benefit
received by a tenant varied according to the characteristics
of that tenant. Therefore, it is not surprising that the
WTC is filling up with tenants who have similar "profiles"
of characteristics.
There are currently approximately 350 firms with
offices in the WTC Amsterdam. The overwhelming majority of
those firms are small, start-up companies that are testing
the market for their services or goods. Interestingly,
unlike some of the other WTC facilities studied, there are
not a lot of government trade-related agencies located in
the WTC Amsterdam. The Chamber of Commerce and Industry for
Amsterdam has a small office in the main hall of the WTC,
but their main offices are in their own building downtown.
Similarly, customs brokers and agents are not a large
component of the WTC tenant roster.
The average size of a tenant staff in the WTC is less
than ten people, and a great number of the companies are
much smaller. 38 The facilities manager of the WTC, Mr.
Boudewyn G.J. van de Rhoer, estimates that 10% of the
tenants in the facility are literally running one person
offices. Fully 20% of the firms in the WTC have offices
38 Gijsberts, 26 June 1992.
that occupy less than 50 square meters of space, and 80%
occupy less than 500 square meters each. Even the largest
of the tenant companies, concentrated in the eastern tower
of the complex, only use 1000 to 1500 square meter
offices.39
In the words of one of the WTC tenants, Mr. J.W. Eweg:
"The WTC is a greenhouse, where small companies are
grown.,,40
The similar profiles of the tenants in the WTC raises
the issue of tenant synergy. Tenants were asked how useful
they found being co-located in the same facility as other
firms doing international business. None of the respondents
was able to quantify a value to their business of co-
location, but several claimed that it was a factor in their
decision to rent space in the WTC. On this issue, one thing
that is known is that after the WTC management company was
able to locate the Netherlands offices of three Japanese
banks in the building, the number of other Japanese
companies wanting to lease space increased dramatically. At
this time, more than 30% of all Japanese companies with
offices in Holland have those offices in the Amsterdam WTC
facility.41
39 Ibid.
40 Interview with J.W. Eweg, Eweg Makelaars (real estate
brokers), Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 24 June 1992.
41 van de Rhoer, 22 June 1992.
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As was discussed in Chapter Two, the abundance of small
tenants in the building was always the intent of the
developer. Small tenants are viewed as being well suited to
the entire WTC concept; they are the heaviest users of the
Business Services Department and the small meeting room
facilities available in the WTC.
The size of the tenant's offices within the WTC can be
misleading though; frequently these tenants are branch
offices of larger, well-established national or
international firms that are investigating the possibilities
of expanding their operations into the Dutch or European
markets.
Approximately 50% of the firms in the WTC are involved
primarily in international trade-related business. The
current leasing strategy of the WTC management company is to
further increase the proportion of foreign-trade related
companies in the tenant mix of the WTC. To this end, the
in-house broker for the WTC, Mr. A.W.J. Gijsberts, gives
first preference for any space that becomes available to
internationally-involved businesses on his waiting list.42
As was stated above, the benefits that are perceived by
tenants to being associated with the WTC can be separated
into two categories. The next section concerns the physical
attributes of the WTC.
Design of the Facility
42 Gijsberts, 26 June 1992.
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The physical design of the facility, described in
detail in Chapter Two, is generally considered to provide
several significant benefits to the tenants. The benefits
most frequently cited by tenants included: the underground
parking garage, the ability to subdivide floor areas into
very small tenant spaces, and the lower level retail mall.
In general, the tenants were very appreciative of the
physical attributes of the WTC complex. That is not to say
that there are not complaints and contentious issues related
to the building's design.
The tenants, as end users of the facility, obviously
have developed definite opinions about the building design.
Three design drawbacks that were repeatedly mentioned during
tenant interviews included the "cool" interior design of the
public areas, the inability of tenants to get water service
to their individual offices, and the short vertical height
of the continuous strip glazing at the office levels.
The sleek, modern design of the public areas was
referred to several times as "too institutional." One
tenant even thought that the interiors of the building
inhibited the initiation of informal business contacts
between tenants.
The issue of water and washroom service only being
available at the core area of each office floor was also
consistently criticized by tenants. The consensus of the
tenants was that they should at least be able have a sink in
their office suites. The opinion of the management company
on this issue was that the provision of water service to
every small tenant space in the facility would be
prohibitively expensive. Their position was that if a
tenant is willing to pay to have water lines run to his
suite, they are free to do so.4 No tenant has done that
yet.
The third issue, the short window heights in the office
areas, is a concern to both tenants and the management
company. Mr. B.G.J. van de Rhoer of the WTC Management
Company explained that the window problem is a result of an
old Dutch building code requirement.
When the WTC was built, it was one of the first tall
office buildings in Holland. At that time, there was a
building code in place that required window sills in tall
buildings to be approximately 1.07 meters (3'-6") above the
floor level of the room. This code was intended to
discourage suicidal office workers from jumping out of their
windows. What it achieved was the creation of windows that
a seated person cannot use, except to look at the sky.
Shortly after the completion of the WTC, this onerous
code was repealed. That has meant that new towers are now
able to provide more appealing windows in their office
areas. The opinion of some Commercial Brokers is that this
4 van de Rhoer, 24 June 1992.
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issue has put the WTC at a slight leasing disadvantage."
The management of the WTC has investigated the
possibility of replacing the curtain-wall system that
includes the offending windows, but the cost would be far
too high to be justified.
A final design issue, alluded to earlier, is the
proportion of exhibit and conference areas relative to the
office areas. There is a constant debate between the
managers of the WTC, the Chamber of Commerce, and the local
Association of WTC tenants, about whether some of the
existing exhibit and restaurant areas should be converted to
more lucrative office space.
The second group of benefits provided to tenants by the
WTC facility can be categorized as "special services."
Special Services Offered By the WTC
What the WTCA calls "special services" are those
services that a WTC offers that are atypical of a standard
office development and are specifically designed to make it
easier for the WTC tenants to conduct international trade-
related business. The WTCA list of special services
includes: a World Trade Center Club, trade information
centers, trade education services, meeting facilities,
display and exhibit facilities, temporary offices, temporary
secretaries, translating services, trade missions, trading
companies, and hotel facilities. A recent addition to the
44 Eweg, 24 June 1992.
WTCA services list is access to NETWORK, a computerized
data-base and trading system. All WTC facilities provide at
least some of these services, selecting from the above list
the services that best suit the needs of their market. The
WTC Amsterdam currently offers the entire list of WTCA
services, with the exception of on-site hotel facilities.
During the interview process, tenants were asked both
which services were most important to them, and which they
used the most frequently. The answers to those questions
suggest that tenants frequently value having a service
available in the building, even though they might not use it
very frequently. An example of this is the WTC Club and
Restaurant, which several tenants said that they appreciated
having available for entertaining clients occasionally, but
did not use for their own meals on a regular basis. A
number of tenants commented that the club and restaurant
were too formal and that they themselves were too busy to
take the time to use them. They preferred to take their
lunches in the cafeteria-style facilities at the retail
level of the WTC.
The tenant interviews also suggest that the decision of
the WTC Management Company to reduce the number of temporary
offices available is a sound one. The tenants interviewed
neither valued that service very highly nor used it very
frequently. (see exhibits 1 & 2).
On the other hand, the Business Services Department
seems to be very popular for the telephone and secretarial
services they provide. This is particularly true for the
small tenants, who can avoid paying for full-time office
staff by using the WTC office services when necessary.
In general, the smallest tenant firms appear to place
the highest value on the special services available to them.
One tenant, who runs a single-person office as a
representative for a large insurance company, stated that he
chose to locate his offices in the WTC primarily because of
the telephone answering service provided by the Business
Services Department. He also frequently used the
translation and secretarial staff that is available.
The interviews confirmed that typically, once a tenant
grows large enough to support a full-time office staff of
its own, the perceived value of the additional WTC services
drops. Those firms with their own staffs stated that they
appreciated having the option to get additional help from
the Business Services Department when necessary, but it was
rare that they needed it.
The manager of the Business Services Department, Mrs.
Ada van der Ent Braat, is well aware of the reduction in use
of WTC secretarial services that occurs when a tenant
exceeds a certain size.45 She has shared her observations
with the rest of the WTC management team. In response to
45 Interview with Ada van der Ent Braat, World Trade Center
Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 24 June 1992.
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this issue, and the on-going leasing strategy of the
Commercial Department, Mr. Gijsberts encourages those firms
that grow large enough to require more than 500 square
meters of space to leave the WTC. In addition, the current
leasing policy is to not accept any tenant who wants office
space of more than 1000 square meters, and only allow them
that much space if they fit the desired "international
trade-related" tenant profile.46
Real Estate Brokers interviewed view the special
services provided as another way that the facility has
differentiated itself in the Amsterdam market. While none
of the Brokers interviewed believe that tenants locate in
the WTC strictly in order to get use of the special
services, they all considered those services as something of
value to the type of tenants that suited the WTC. They all
said that they would mention the special services to a
tenant as an attribute of the WTC.
The consensus of the Brokers was that the special
services are an integral part of the "WTC concept" and that
it is that entire concept, rather than the independent
pieces, that is attractive to tenants.
The tenants in general felt that the WTC, despite the
rents charged, was very competitive with other office space
available. "Obviously it is, or I would not have just
46 Gijsberts, 26 June 1992.
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renewed my lease." was the summation of one tenant.47
Conclusions From On-site Interviews
With regard to the questions of Chapter One, it is
apparent that WTC tenants have been willing to enter into
rental agreements that are more favorable to the landlord
than other leases in the Amsterdam market. Not only have
lease rates in the WTC been consistently higher than other
prime space in the market, tenants have also been willing to
provide credit assurances from their lenders and pay
significant fees for the special services offered by the
WTC.
The costs of the special services offered by the WTC
are recouped through the annual fees charged to tenants,
which allows the above-market rental rates for WTC space to
compensate the Owners for the membership fees paid annually
to the WTCA as well as any additional costs incurred due to
management of the WTC facility.48
The market premium that tenants are willing to pay for
space in the WTC (approximately 30 Dfl/sq.m./year in 1991)
adds significantly to the value of the project. Capitalized
at the most recent "A" grade investment rate of 6.25% (see
figure 1), the additional 2.25 million guilders per year
generated by the rental premiums increase the value of the
47 Interview with Hans Dijkman, Korn Ferry International,
Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 25 June 1992.
48 Draak, 6 July 1992.
WTC Amsterdam by 36 million guilders (approximately US $21
million).
The benefits to tenants of the WTC of the co-location
of trade-related businesses in one complex is more difficult
to assess. While none of the parties involved in the WTC is
able to point to specific trade-related companies that have
been formed as a result of the activities of the WTC,
several tenants reported that interaction with other tenants
in the facility has boosted their business. 4 9
On the other hand, the positive impact of the
development of the WTC on the regional economy as a whole is
indisputable. The WTC was the first large office complex
built in the High South neighborhood of Amsterdam; the
subsequent emergence of that area as the most prestigious
suburban office location in the city is in large part due to
the success of the WTC facility. The development of this
area has benefitted the Amsterdam economy not only through
the stimulation of the construction sector, but also through
increases in the city's tax base.
The WTC Amsterdam is a very successful facility; the
Owners, Regional Business Community, Public Sector, World
Trade Centers Association, and Tenants have all reaped
significant benefits from its development. Its continued
success should act as a model for other prospective World
49 Interview with Jan M.C.H. Ruhe, R.B.O.G., Amsterdam,
The Netherlands, 26 June 1992.
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Trade Center developments.
The following chapter provides a comparative analysis
of the WTC Amsterdam relative to the other four WTC
facilities that have been studied.
CHAPTER FOUR
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF WTC AMSTERDAM
RELATIVE TO OTHERS STUDIED
Introduction
The critical question that is asked by prospective
developers, or sponsors, of a World Trade Center is: What
makes a successful WTC?
Our study of five WTC facilities around the world confirmed
that this question has no simple answer.
Comparison
As is the case with other development projects, for a WTC
development to be successful it must be well conceived
relative to the requirements of its market. Thus, there is
no fixed recipe for a successful WTC facility; what is
appropriate for Amsterdam or Taipei is likely to be
completely inappropriate for New York City or Portland,
Oregon. Consider, for example, the difference between the
designs of the WTC facilities in Amsterdam and New York
City. Apart from the obvious issue of scale, the basic
designs of the two facilities reflect differences in the
requirements of their markets. The huge, open floorplates
that characterize the New York facility, and efficiently
serve its large, "headquarters" tenants, would be completely
useless to the small tenants that fill the Amsterdam WTC.
Similarly, the vast exhibition spaces of the Taipei WTC
would never find enough users in the Curacao or Portland
markets to justify their inclusion in either of those
centers.
This is not to say that the success of each of the five
facilities that were studied is completely unrelated.
Indeed, while the individual WTC's visited were very
different from one another in many ways, they did share a
critical common attribute: the special WTC services. Those
WTC services that were offered by each of the facilities
studied included:
1) the provision of temporary secretarial, office and
translation services on a pay-for-use basis,
2) membership in the WTC Club with access to other WTC
facilities around the world,
3) courses and seminars on international trade-related
issues,
4) facilities for trade fairs, exhibitions, and
conferences, and
5) access to NETWORK, the WTCA's worldwide computerized
trading system.
While the services offered by the five centers are
similar, the impact of those services on the success of any
specific facility varies.
In addition to the mix of services offered, other
important factors affecting the success of a WTC that were
revealed by our study included: the business culture, trade
environment, and size of the country in which the WTC was
operating. An underlying, absolutely critical, factor in
the success of a WTC facility is the strength of the real
estate concept behind that facility. Each of these factors
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is discussed in this chapter.
Cultural Issues
The importance of cultural preference in the success or
failure of a WTC development should not be underestimated.
Despite the continuing globalization of international trade,
there will always be differences in the way disparate
cultures do business. These differences can determine
whether or not a specific WTC attribute will be accepted or
rejected by a WTC's business community.
In Amsterdam, for instance, tenants typically only use
the WTC Club and restaurant facilities infrequently, while
in Taipei the club is heavily used and is in fact considered
an absolute necessity for doing business. Since the quality
of the food, service, and ambience of the two clubs is
comparable, the difference in their relative success appears
to be at least partially due to cultural differences between
the "host" business communities. The "club" as a place in
which to conduct business is an integral part of Asian
business culture, but it does not play nearly as large a
role in Dutch business tradition.50
Trade Environment Issues
An absolutely critical factor in the success of a WTC
facility is the existing trade environment in which the
facility is located.
WTC facilities are typically proposed for one of two
50 van de Plassche, 23 June 1992.
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reasons: either to capture a share of an established trade-
related economy or to try to create a foreign-trade sector
for a less established economy. Different strategies are
required of a WTC to achieve either one or the other of
these goals. The challenge to initiate foreign-trade where
none existed before is obviously the more difficult one. If
successful, a WTC built in a less established trading
economy may effectively create its own market. The creation
of this new market may, in turn, have a major impact on the
regional economy. Thus, a successful WTC located in an
economy that was not previously heavily trade-related will
likely gain a great deal of influence within that economy.
The objective of capturing market share, faced by the
WTC in an established trade-related economy, is a more
straightforward challenge. The newly built WTC will likely
be only one of several components of the existing trade
environment; both the impact and the influence of the WTC on
that environment will be relatively less significant.
This concept is immediately apparent when comparing the
Amsterdam WTC to others, such as the Curacao ITC and the
Taipei WTC.
As was outlined in Chapter Two, Amsterdam's economy has
been dependent on international trade for centuries.
Therefore, an extensive network of companies and individuals
who could benefit from a WTC's ability to centralize trade-
related business was already in place prior to the
construction of the Amsterdam WTC. The primary role for the
WTC Amsterdam will continue to be to increase Amsterdam's
"market share" of international trade-related business
relative to other European cities.
The situation in Taipei is similar. The entire economy
of Taiwan is based on international trade; while this trade
orientation created an opportunity to develop a successful
WTC facility, it means that the impact of the Taipei WTC on
the greater economy of Taiwan may be relatively limited.
International trade would go on in Taiwan whether the WTC
was developed or not.
In both Amsterdam and Taipei, the role of the WTC
facility was to provide a place in which existing trade-
related companies could meet and do business. While the
activities at the Amsterdam and Taipei WTCs sometimes lead
to the formation of new companies involved in international
trade, that is not the primary intent of either facility.
In Curacao, on the other hand, the contingent of
existing international trading companies is not nearly as
large. In that situation, the governmental sponsors of the
WTC were trying to use the WTC concept to foster the
development of an international-trade industry for the
island of Curacao, rather than just provide a focal point
for an already established industry. While this is a
commendable goal, it obviously will take some considerable
time to achieve.
Thus, while the Amsterdam WTC has been a financial
success almost since its inception, the Curacao facility
continues to require substantial governmental subsidies in
order to operate. By this measure, the Amsterdam WTC has
been the greater success to date, but the long term impact
of the Curacao WTC on its local economy may still compensate
for its slow beginning.
Another trade-environment issue that can be a major
determinant of the success of a WTC is the amount and
character of regulation regarding international trade that
is imposed by the government of the country in which that
WTC is located. Obviously, over-regulation, restrictive
trade policies, or excessive trade tariffs can severely
undermine the ability of a WTC to function effectively.
That does not necessarily mean that the best environment for
a successful WTC is in a totally unregulated market. One of
the services typically offered by a WTC facility is
information about how to do business within the local trade
regulations; without those regulations a WTC loses one
advantage that it currently has over other office space in
its market.
Country Size Issues
As discussed above, the trade policies of the country
in which a WTC is located can dramatically effect the
success of that WTC. As a result, developers and other
participants in a proposed WTC should fully understand the
ability of the WTC to influence the enactment or change of
those policies.
In general, the smaller the host country, the larger
the potential impact of the WTC on that country's trade
industry, and the more influence the WTC can have on the
trade policies of that country. An example of this is the
WTC Curacao, where the very small size of the country,
combined with the government's ongoing financial support of
the WTC, means that the management of the WTC have frequent,
close contact with government policy-makers.
Another issue related to the size of the host country
is whether a WTC will be acting as the single source for
international trade for that nation or will be competing
with other locations within the same country for its share
of the international trade business being conducted by that
nation. While the "single source" situation is the one in
which the Curacao WTC finds itself, the second situation is
the one faced by most new WTC facilities developed in the
world's larger industrialized countries.
The Portland, Oregon WTC facility is a perfect example
of this. Portland's status as just one of several U.S.
facilities involved in international trade means that its
role is primarily one of trying to increase its "market
share" of the nation's international trade. Portland's
direct competitors are the other cities within its region
who would also be able to act as locations for international
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trade. The status of Portland as one relatively small
contributor to the overall international trade industry of
the U.S. means that its ability to affect the amount of
international trade done by the U.S. is limited. This in
turn limits Portland's influence over the setting of
national foreign trade policies.
The Amsterdam WTC, though located in a country far
smaller than the United States, is in a position similar to
that of Portland. Amsterdam currently competes for its
share of The Netherland's international trade business with
the other major cities of the Randstad, notably Utrecht, The
Hague, and the port city of Rotterdam.51
The imminent formation of the European Community (EC)
will mean that Amsterdam will become part of the world's
largest economic power. The enlargement of Amsterdam's
market to encompass the EC, while creating great
opportunities for the city to capitalize on its niche as the
"Gateway to Europe", also means that the ability of the
Amsterdam WTC to influence trade policy will be reduced.
Amsterdam's competition will no longer be just the other
Dutch cities, but also the other major European trading
cities. The role of the Amsterdam WTC will become even more
focused than it is now on increasing Amsterdam's market
share of the trade done by the EC. In this respect, the
51Frans M. Dieleman and Sako Musterd, eds.,
The Randstad: A Research and Policy Laboratory (Dordrecht,
The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992), p. 103.
65
market position of the WTC Amsterdam will be increasingly
similar to that of the WTC in Portland, Oregon, and other
satellite WTCs in large countries.
Real Estate Issues
It has become apparent from our study that, while the
designation of a well-conceived real estate project as a
World Trade Center can have significant benefits to that
project, the WTC designation alone is not enough to salvage
a poorly-conceived development.
The success of the WTC Amsterdam is due in large part
to an astute concept executed by the developer and his
design team. The provision of grade "A" office space,
complete with underground parking, 24 hour security, on-site
retail services, easy access to both a freeway and public
transit station, and designed to accommodate an under-
serviced segment of the local office market, would probably
have made the complex a success even without the WTC
designation. In this case, the World Trade Center name
added value to the project in two ways. First, as was
described in Chapter Two, the WTC designation was critical
to the re-zoning approval for the South Amsterdam site.
Second, the WTC designation gave the project both a
prestigious identity and a focus group upon which to
concentrate leasing efforts.
The Portland WTC is another example of a well conceived
real estate project being enhanced by the WTC name. In the
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case of WTC Portland, the facility had been recognized as a
successful office development in a prime location for
several years before the WTC designation was pursued. The
WTC name primarily added value to the existing development
by identifying the complex as Portland's logical location
for companies involved in international trade.
The on-going financial difficulties faced by the
Curacao ITC demonstrate that the WTC designation alone is
not enough to guarantee a successful real estate
development. The excessive construction costs of the
Curacao facility, combined with both the failure of the
exhibition areas to generate much international interest and
the lack to date of enough convenient hotel rooms to make
the convention market viable, are problems that have not
been able to be overcome by the WTC designation.
The bright side of the Curacao situation is that the
WTC Curacao, despite its problems, is still the best office
product on the island. Tenants are not locating there
because it is a World Trade Center, but because it has 24
hour security and a working telephone system.
Conclusions
As was stated earlier, despite the fact that there is
no easily followed recipe for a successful World Trade
Center facility, there are several general determinants of
success apparent in the five WTCs studied for this thesis.
These determining characteristics can be used to establish a
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basic set of guidelines to the successful establishment of a
WTC.
The first of these guidelines is that success begins
with a well conceived and well executed real estate
development. Each component of the WTC facility must be
tailored to the real estate needs of the local market.
Thus, the developer of a WTC must not only understand the
local office space market, but also potentially the hotel,
conference center, and retail markets as well. Obviously,
being able to differentiate a project from competitors in
its market is also crucial. For example, in addition to the
WTC services and designation, each of the WTC facilities
studied somehow differentiated themselves from other
projects in their markets:
i) WTC Amsterdam caters to small tenants and offers
amenities such as underground parking, consumer
services, and proximity to public transit,
ii) the Portland WTC offers a unique waterfront
location that is highly valued by tenants,
iii) the Curacao ITC provides both modern
telecommunications services and the only first
class office space on the island,
iv) WTC Taipei offers some of the only "for lease"
office space in its market, and
v) the New York WTC offers the visibility, identity,
and prestige that is uniquely associated with two
of the tallest buildings in the world.
It is likely that any of these projects would be
successful with or without the WTC designation; that
designation, and the services associated with it, are used
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to further differentiate already successful real estate
projects.
The second guideline regarding the success of a WTC is
that the existing local trade environment should be
particularly well understood by any proponent of a new WTC
development. The degree to which a WTC will be successful
is at least as dependent on the local trade environment as
on any design or operating characteristics of the facility.
Therefore, it is crucial that the developers and supporters
of a new WTC facility know precisely what the role of that
facility is going to be in its trade environment, and have
planned accordingly.
The strategy of a WTC management team must closely
reflect the competitive position of the region in which the
WTC is located. Examples of different strategies in
response to different competitive positions are provided by
the Amsterdam and Taipei WTC facilities. Amsterdam's
history as a trading city and its location in the heart of
Europe make it reasonable for the WTC Amsterdam to act
primarily as a distribution center for goods and services
entering and leaving Europe. Thus, the strategy of the WTC
Management Company to target as potential tenants firms
seeking to gain access to Europe has been well suited to the
competitive position of the WTC Amsterdam. By contrast,
Taiwan's position as a major manufacturer means that the
role of the Taipei WTC is more of an exhibition center for
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Taiwanese export goods than a distribution center. The
large exhibition halls of the Taipei WTC reflect a strategy
intended to capitalize on that role.
In addition to understanding the local real estate
market and the competitive position of a WTC within its
trade environment, developers of new WTC facilities must be
sensitive to the cultural preferences and traditions of the
local business community. As discussed earlier, this
understanding is particularly important with regard to the
planning of services and amenities to be offered by the WTC.
A final guideline for the success of any new WTC
facility is that the proponents of that facility should make
every effort to learn from the experience of established
World Trade Centers. The Owners and supporters of existing
WTC facilities must also continue to learn from each other.
The World Trade Center Amsterdam, while obviously successful
from several perspectives, has learned several lessons the
hard way. By interacting more closely with managers and
developers of other WTCs, future hard lessons may be
avoided. Specifically, the experience of the Taipei WTC
with running a hotel in conjunction with a WTC could prove
very useful with WTC Amsterdam's proposed expansion. Also,
the willingness of the Portland WTC management staff to
eliminate services that were not being sufficiently utilized
could be an example to the WTC Amsterdam Management Company
regarding the underutilized Club and Executive Office
services that currently exist.
The experience gained by those involved in the creation
of the five WTC facilities studied, whether they were the
developers, owners, promoters, or managers, is invaluable.
It should be shared both between themselves and with others
interested in fostering the World Trade Center concept.
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APPENDIX A: EXHIBITS
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WTC AMSTERDAM STUDY: EXHIBIT ONE
TENANT PREFERENCES REGARDING WTC
Characteristic
WTC SERVICES
Business Services
Conference Facilities
WTC Club
WTC Restaurant
Exhibition Areas
Translation Services
Temporary Office Suites
Video-Conf. Facility
WTCA Membership
OTHER AMENITIES
Rail link to airport
A10 Freeway
Underground Parking
Travel Agency
Bank
Post Office
Retail Shops
Cafetera
Bar/Cafe
24 Hour Accessibility
Public Transit to Downtown
0%
14%
0%
14%
14%
0%
29%
0%
29%
43%
29%
57%
0%
14%
57%
0%
14%
57%
29%
42%
14%
57%
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Consistantly
AMSTERDAM CHARACTERISTICS
Freauency of Use
Never Occasionally
29% 57%
14% 43%
29% 57%
14% 72%
57% 29%
29% 71%
86% 14%
71% 29%
o/- 86%
14%
43%
14%
14%
14%
0%
0%
0%
14%
43%
86%
86%
29%
86%
86%
14%
71%
29%
43%
14%
WTC AMSTERDAM STUDY: EXHIBIT TWO
INFLUENCE ON TENANT DECISION TO MOVE TO WTC AMSTERDAM
Characteristic Importance
Not Important Important
WTC SERVICES
Business Services
Conference Facilities
WTC Club
WTC Restaurant
Exhibition Areas
Translation Services
Temporary Office Suites
Video-Conf. Facility
WTCA Membership
OTHER AMENITIES
Rail link to airport
Al0 Freeway
Underground Parking
Travel Agency
Bank
Post Office
Retail Shops
Cafeteria
Bar/Cafe
24 Hour Accessibility
Public Transit to Downtown
14%
29%
72%
72%
72%
28%
100%
86%
57%
14%
14%
14%
72%
14%
72%
72%
14%
72%
42%
29%
72%
57%
28%
28%
14%
57%
0%
14%
29%
57%
0%
14%
14%
72%
28%
28%
86%
28%
29%
57%
Very Important
14%
14%
0%
0%
14%
14%
0%
0%
14%
29%
86%
72%
14%
14%
0%
0%
0%
0%
29%
14%
WTC AMSTERDAM STUDY: EXHIBIT THREE
GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION OF WTC AMSTERDAM
Map 1: Location in Europe
Map 2: WTC's Location Within Amsterdam
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WTC AMSTERDAM STUDY: EXHIBIT FOUR
APPENDIX B:
SOURCES CONSULTED
Sources Consulted
I. Interviews:
1) Developer/Management Company:
Mrs. Ada van der Ent Braat
Manager, Business Services Department
World Trade Center Amsterdam
Mr. Rolf Draak (telephone interview)
Managing Director
World Trade Center Amsterdam
Mr. A.W.J. Gijsberts
Manager, Commercial Department
World Trade Center Amsterdam
Mr. Boudewyn G.J. van de Rhoer
Manager, Meeting and Restaurant Facilities
World Trade Center Amsterdam
Mr. N.J.M. de Rooij
Secretary General
World Trade Center Amsterdam Association
Mr. Jan J. Veerman
Controller
World Trade Center Amsterdam
2. Owners:
Mr. Cordell Lietz
Vice President
ABP: North American Real Estate Division
Mr. Cees van der Muelen (telephone interview)
Portfolio Manager
Algemeen burgerlijk pensioenfonds N.V.
3. Tenants:
Mr. Hans R. Ph. Dijkman
Vice President - Partner
Korn Ferry International
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Mr. J.W. Eweg
Principal
Eweg Makelaars
Ph J. D. Molhuysen
Representative for Europe
English & American Group Plc
Mr. Jaap D. van de Plassche
Manager, Passenger Sales
Swissair
Mr. Rene Rebel
Operations Manager
PTT Telecom
Mr. Jan M.C.H. Ruhe
Director
R.B.O.G. Property Consultants
Mr. W. de Wit
Manager, Trade Information Center (WTC)
Chamber of Commerce and Industry for Amsterdam
4. Brokers:
Mr. H. Cramer
Broker
Van Gool & Partners
Mr. J.W. Eweg
Principal
Eweg Makelaars
Mr. A.W.J. Gijsberts
Manager, Commercial Department (in-house broker)
World Trade Center Amsterdam
Mr. H.A.F. Hagemeijer
Adjunct-director
Zadelhoff Makelaars
5. Regional Business Community/Public Sector:
Mr. W. do Wit
Manager, Trade Information Center (WTC)
Chamber of Commerce and Industry for Amsterdam
Mr. Henk J.M. Woerdman
Director, Trade Promotion
Chamber of Commerce and Industry for Amsterdam
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II. Periodicals & Reports:
Pascoe, Robin, "Dutch Courage," Voyager, June
1992, pp. 10-15.
Public Relations Department, Amsterdam airport
Schiphol, The Development of Schiphol, January,
1990, pp. 2-21.
R.B.O.G. Property Consultants, The Netherlands
1991. Amsterdam: R.B.O.G., 1991.
III. Books:
Dieleman, Frans M., and Musterd, Sako. The
Randstad: A Research and Policy Laboratory.
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992.
IV. Television Broadcasts:
Decade of Change: The 1990's. Television news
special on "The Monitor Channel", 10 July 1992.
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